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Redefining Reality: Why Design Patent Protection Should Expand to the
Virtual World
Abstract

Virtual reality (“VR”) and augmented reality (“AR”) technologies are rapidly maturing. Companies like
Facebook and Microsoft are capitalizing on these technologies and actively releasing products to consumers.
Both companies’ products blur the line between the real world and the virtual world. The blurring of this line
presents novel questions regarding the protection of digital intellectual property that exists solely within the
virtual world.
One such question is whether design patent protection will be available to three-dimensional digital models,
models of real-world items that are digitally reproduced in the virtual world. To receive design patent
protection, 35 U.S.C. § 171 requires, inter alia, that the subject matter be an “article of manufacture.” Based on
existing precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, it appears the court is reluctant to
expand design patent protection to three-dimensional digital models. This Comment argues that the apparent
reluctance of the Federal Circuit to expand intellectual property protections to three-dimensional digital
models, as signaled in its recent decisions in In re Nuijten and ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International
Trade Commission, is at odds with design patent’s § 171.
This Comment analyzes § 171 and its broad interpretation by the Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). After, the Comment contends that the Federal Circuit’s current trend
deviates from the CCPA’s precedent and argues that the court should return to the broad interpretation of §
171. This broad interpretation would provide design patent protection to three-dimensional digital models
present in VR and AR worlds.
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COMMENT
REDEFINING REALITY: WHY DESIGN
PATENT PROTECTION SHOULD
EXPAND TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD
JOHN R. BOULÉ III*
Virtual reality (“VR”) and augmented reality (“AR”) technologies are
rapidly maturing. Companies like Facebook and Microsoft are capitalizing on
these technologies and actively releasing products to consumers. Both
companies’ products blur the line between the real world and the virtual world.
The blurring of this line presents novel questions regarding the protection of
digital intellectual property that exists solely within the virtual world.
One such question is whether design patent protection will be available to
three-dimensional digital models, models of real-world items that are digitally
reproduced in the virtual world. To receive design patent protection, 35
U.S.C. § 171 requires, inter alia, that the subject matter be an “article of
manufacture.” Based on existing precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, it appears the court is reluctant to expand design patent
protection to three-dimensional digital models.
This Comment argues that the apparent reluctance of the Federal Circuit
to expand intellectual property protections to three-dimensional digital models,
as signaled in its recent decisions in In re Nuijten and ClearCorrect
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Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission, is at odds with
design patent’s § 171. This Comment analyzes § 171 and its broad
interpretation by the Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA). After, the Comment contends that the Federal
Circuit’s current trend deviates from the CCPA’s precedent and argues that the
court should return to the broad interpretation of § 171. This broad
interpretation would provide design patent protection to three-dimensional
digital models present in VR and AR worlds.
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INTRODUCTION
“What is real? How do you define ‘real’? If you’re talking about what you
can feel, what you can smell, what you can taste and see, then ‘real’ is simply
electrical signals interpreted by your brain.” 1
Given the explosion of virtual reality (“VR”), an environment
where the real world is replaced with a virtual one, and augmented
reality (“AR”), an environment where the real world is supplemented
by computer-generated input,2 this once futuristic quote from The
Matrix has become more relevant today. These technologies are
available to consumers through a variety of gadgets, ranging from
high-end headsets, such as the Oculus Rift,3 to more common
products, such as a smartphone screen and camera that are used in
Pokémon Go.4 These technologies seek to immerse the user in a
virtual reality, seamlessly merging the real and electronic worlds.5 As
1. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999).
2. Vivek Sharma, Technology Startups: The Game-Changers of Virtual and Augmented
Reality, IPWATCHDOG (June 18, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/18/tec
hnology-startups-virtual-augmented-reality/id=70162.
3. See Max Chafkin, Why Facebook’s $2 Billion Bet on Oculus Rift Might One Day
Connect Everyone on Earth, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 8, 2015, 2:00 PM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/09/oculus-rift-mark-zuckerberg-cover-storypalmer-luckey (describing how the Oculus Rift made the user flinch when lighting
firecrackers in a virtual world).
4. See Victor Thomson, “Pokemon Go” Game Totally Changes Virtual Reality World,
ITECH POST (Aug. 13, 2016, 3:20 AM), http://www.itechpost.com/articles/24335/20
160813/pokemon-go-game-totally-changes-virtual-reality-world.htm (reporting that
the app uses the “smartphone’s GPS to find, train, fight, and capture virtual
creatures that are superimposed on the real world”).
5. See Vamien McKalin, Augmented Reality vs. Virtual Reality: What Are the
Differences and Similarities?, TECH TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014, 10:25 PM),
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/5078/20140406/augmented-reality-vs-virtual-
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touted by most manufacturers of VR and AR technology, this
technology provides a new canvas for movies, video games, and
advertisers.6 Content developers create these worlds using threedimensional models, which are computer-programmed models that
mimic items in our world.7 Once the technology matures, the line
between the physical world and the virtual world may seemingly
disappear.8 As this line disappears, it may become impossible to
distinguish a physical object from a virtual three-dimensional digital
model placed right next to it.9
Unsurprisingly, the explosion of these technologies presents new
challenges and questions regarding intellectual property rights.10
One question involving the interaction between intellectual property
and the VR and AR worlds is whether a three-dimensional digital model
will meet the statutory requirements for a design patent, which protects
the aesthetic appearance of a functional item.11 In recent years, design
patents have grown in value, making them important parts of an
intellectual property portfolio.12 As the use of VR and AR continues to
grow, individuals and businesses will likely seek to use such patents to
protect the three-dimensional digital models used in these worlds.

reality-what-are-the-differences-and-similarities.htm (concluding that AR might prove
more successful because it does not completely remove a user from the real world).
6. See, e.g., Aaron Luber, What Virtual Reality Will Mean for Advertising, THINK
WITH GOOGLE (June 2016), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/articles/virtual-realityadvertising.html (noting that VR can work with pre-existing media in the
entertainment industry to create new experiences).
7. See What Is Virtual Reality?, VIRTUAL REALITY SOC’Y, https://www.vrs.org.uk/virt
ual-reality/what-is-virtual-reality.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
8. See McKalin, supra note 5.
9. See Katie Collins, Oculus Can Now Transform the Real World into a Video Game,
WIRED U.K. (May 27, 2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/oculus-acquires-surrealvision-to-map-virtual-reality-worlds (describing a technology that allows Oculus users
to interact with real world objects in the virtual world).
10. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Purow, Virtual Reality May Create Novel IP Issues in the Real
World, LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2016, 10:10 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/769479/
virtual-reality-may-create-novel-ip-issues-in-the-real-world.
11. See General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents.
12. See Tracey-Gene Durkin, IPO Report Shows Design Patent Filings Continue to Rise,
IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/08/19/iporeport-shows-design-patent-filings-continue-to-rise/id=44720
(overviewing
an
Intellectual Property Owners Association report that demonstrated a rise in design
patent applications); Gene Quinn, Design Patents: The Under Utilized and Overlooked
Patent, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/10/de
sign-patents/id=72714 (arguing that design patents are becoming a more useful tool
to protect an invention).
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Although the need for design patent protection of threedimensional models has grown, design patent protection for the
models has an uncertain legal future. Congress last updated the
design patent statute in 1952 when it amended 35 U.S.C. § 171 to
grant a design patent to “[w]hoever invents any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”13 Thus, to receive
a design patent, the design must be “for an article of manufacture.”14
As written, the scope of the article of manufacture requirement is
unclear, but throughout the twentieth century, courts were willing to
interpret the requirement fairly broadly.15 However, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently articulated a narrower
view, first when applying the requirement to electronic and digital
technologies,16 and next when interpreting article of manufacture
requirements in statutes akin to § 171.17
This Comment argues that as VR and AR technologies develop, the
Federal Circuit and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
should interpret the design patent subject matter protection statute
broadly, incorporating three-dimensional digital models into its
scope. Part I provides background, surveying the history and current
state of the art of VR and AR technologies, and reviews the USPTO’s
and the courts’ interpretations of § 171 of the design patent statute.
Part II then argues that courts should apply a broad interpretation of
the article of manufacture requirement as adopted by the U.S. Court
of Customs and Patents Appeals (CCPA), and that the Federal Circuit
improperly narrowed the scope of an “article of manufacture” when
it applied the requirement to three-dimensional digital models.
I. VIRTUAL AND AUGMENTED REALITY: ITS ROOTS, ITS CURRENT
STATE, AND THE TREATMENT OF SIMILAR TECHNOLOGIES IN COURT
The recent advancement of VR and AR has put these technologies on
a collision course with design patent law. VR and AR technologies were
created in the mid-twentieth century and are just reaching maturity

13. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
14. Id.
15. See infra Section I.C.2 (discussing early court interpretations of § 171).
16. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007); infra Section I.C.4
(discussing the modern interpretation of § 171).
17. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam);
infra Section I.C.4 (discussing the modern interpretation of § 171).
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today.18 In contrast, Congress first created design patent protection in
the mid-nineteenth century.19 As design patent law developed, courts
initially maintained an inclusive view of the subject matter the design
patent statute protected.20 Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has
begun to narrow what subject matter may be protected.21
A. An Overview of Virtual and Augmented Reality
Understanding the challenges surrounding VR and AR
technologies and intellectual property rights requires understanding
the technology itself, especially its history and the current state of the
virtual and augmented art.
1.

A brief history of virtual and augmented reality
Depending on how virtual and augmented reality are defined, the two
have a surprisingly long history.22 In the 1950s and 1960s, inventors
launched various digital and electronic technologies that established the
VR world, including both commercial and defense technologies.23
In the commercial realm, inventors created entertainment
technologies to rudimentarily stimulate the user’s senses—sight,
sound, smell, and touch.24 In the defense realm, Air Force-funded

18. See infra Section I.A (surveying the history of VR and AR, the issues inventors
have encountered during development, and the current state of the art).
19. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44; see also In re Schnell,
46 F.2d 203, 205 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (discussing the history of the design patent statute).
20. See infra Section I.C.1–3 (detailing the expansion of the article of
manufacture requirement from small mechanical features, to large immovable
objects, to software icons).
21. See infra Section I.C.4 (reviewing recent decisions of the Federal Circuit that
signal a narrow interpretation of the article of manufacture requirement).
22. See generally History of Virtual Reality, VIRTUAL REALITY SOC’Y,
http://www.vrs.org.uk/virtual-reality/history.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2017)
(presenting the chronological history of VR technology from paintings to modern
devices, such as the Oculus Rift).
23. Adi Robertson & Michael Zelenko, The Rise and Fall of Virtual Reality: Voices
from a Virtual Past, VERGE, http://www.theverge.com/a/virtual-reality/oral_history
(last visited Apr. 28, 2017); see also History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22. Some
consider large, nineteenth-century panoramic paintings, which had the goal of fully
immersing the viewer into a historic event, or nineteenth-century stereoscopes, which
combined two images into a three-dimensional image to the viewer, as the first VR
technologies. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22; Robertson & Zelenko, supra.
24. See Robertson & Zelenko, supra note 23 (describing filmmaker Morton
Heilig’s invention, the Sensorama, which Heilig imagined to be the “cinema of the
future” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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research improved flight simulators, moving beyond solely
mechanical simulations and adding a digital-visual component.25
As computer-based technology became more affordable to
consumers in the 1970s and 1980s, video games exploded in the
personal entertainment industry.26 During this period, video game
systems shifted away from the large machines found in arcades
towards smaller consoles used in the comfort of one’s home.27 The
electronics industry’s shift from command line prompt control of
computers to graphical user interface control resulted in the wider
availability of video games.28
As the graphical display trend
continued, the next step for the video game industry was moving
from a screen to a fully-immersed VR video game experience.29
Personal entertainment companies championed the quest to craft
technology that could provide VR products for consumers.30 Despite
the trend towards in-home video game consoles, video game
companies began investing in research and development to create
both arcade-based and personal VR video game equipment.31 In the
early 1990s, companies such as Nintendo and Sega created VR-based
video games for use outside of the arcade.32 However, because of
technological shortcomings, the systems of the 1990s were never
commercially successful; the graphical display systems of the products

25. See id. Some in the VR industry considered military flight simulators to be the
cutting edge of the field until computers became pervasive in both business and
personal use. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id. (emphasizing the success of gaming pioneer Atari’s transition from
arcades to homes).
28. Id. Early users operated a computer by entering textual commands into an
interface, such as MS-DOS.
Command Line Interface,
TECHTERMS,
https://techterms.com/definition/command_line_interface (last updated Aug. 26,
2014). Graphical user interface controls streamlined this process by allowing users to
control a computer using tools like windows, icons, and menus. Graphical User Interface,
TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/gui (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
29. See Robertson & Zelenko, supra note 23.
30. Id.
31. See id. (discussing the Atari Sunnyvale Research Laboratory, which was meant
to “explore the future of digital entertainment”; however, the lab operated for only
two years, closing after the video game crash of 1983).
32. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22 (detailing various VR products,
including the Nintendo Virtual Boy and Sega’s VR glasses, both of which failed).
Another company, Virtuality, cornered the arcade-based unit market. See id.
However, these systems proved unsuccessful because they failed to deliver an
experience that kept users coming back. See Kyle Fowle, A Look Back at the Doomed
Virtual Reality Boom of the 90s, KILL SCREEN (Jan. 28, 2015), http://archive.is/5Lhba.
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did not create the immersive experience that developers promised.33
Specifically, the graphic systems, consisting of crude threedimensional digital models, failed to simulate actual, real-world
environments.34 This failure caused the boom of the VR market in
the 1990s to quickly bust, pushing the technology out of the personal
entertainment industry’s spotlight.35 The graphic systems that
remedied the issues of the technology and enabled VR success
became available in the 2000s.36 These systems create the realistic
environments that developers originally promised.37
2.

The current state of the art
In the past five years, developers have made new strides in VR and
AR technology.38 Inventors have remedied the issues that plagued
the technologies in the 1980s and 1990s—mainly the poor graphical
representation of three-dimensional models—through advancements
in three-dimensional graphic systems.39 The reemergence of the
technology has led to investments from the biggest consumer
electronic companies, including Facebook, Microsoft, and Sony.40
The Oculus Rift is setting the technological benchmark for the VR
industry.41 Facebook purchased Oculus Rift for $2 billion in 2014,
signaling that the social media company believed VR was ready for a
33. Fowle, supra note 32 (characterizing the technology as “rudimentary” when
consumers were promised “a glorious vision of the future”). Additionally, primitive
personal entertainment VR equipment was often bulky and awkward. Id. (describing
some of the equipment as allowing only “limited room for movement” and the early
headsets as being “twice the size of your head and just as heavy and unbalanced”).
34. See id.
35. See Robertson & Zelenko, supra note 23. VR technology did not simply
vanish, but the technology development operated with a lower profile. Id. Until
VR’s reemergence later in the 2000s, the military became the biggest supporter of
the technology. Id.
36. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Stuart Dredge, Facebook Closes Its $2bn Oculus Rift Acquisition. What
Next?, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2014, 7:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2014/jul/22/facebook-oculus-rift-acquisition-virtual-reality.
39. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22 (emphasizing that advancements in
graphical display engines and compact computing are driving the latest VR
development); see also supra Section I.A.1 (discussing issues with the development of
VR technology).
40. See Sharma, supra note 2 (outlining the leading investors in VR and AR
technologies).
41. Michael Nuñez, How It Works: The Oculus Rift, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.popsci.com/oculus-rift-how-it-works (naming the Oculus Rift “the most
advanced virtual reality (VR) headset ever created”).
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return to the consumer electronic spotlight.42 One of the main
reasons for the publicity surrounding the Oculus Rift is that, for the
first time in VR history, a unit is delivering “presence”—the feeling
that the user is fully immersed in the virtual world.43 By creating
presence, VR technology allows users to interact with a world where
the three-dimensional models programmed into the system match
those that users come across every day.44 Such virtual interactions can
also allow the users to interact with items they would never come
across, including luxury automobiles and militaristic weapons.45
While Facebook has targeted the VR market, Microsoft has
targeted VR’s sister, AR.46 Microsoft’s flagship AR product, the
HoloLens, promises to merge the actual and virtual worlds into one.47
Because the HoloLens technology actually augments the user’s
perception of the real world, users are able to interact with digital
models as if the model was on the workspace in front of them.48
Other applications of the technology include a virtual-world
television screen to watch a movie, or a virtual model of furniture to
better imagine how the real-world product would fit in a living
42. See Chafkin, supra note 3.
43. Ben Lang, Oculus Shares 5 Key Ingredients for the Presence in Virtual Reality,
ROADTOVR (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.roadtovr.com/oculus-shares-5-keyingredients-for-presence-in-virtual-reality (quoting Martin J. Schumie et al., Research
on Presence in Virtual Reality: A Survey, 4 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 183, 185 (2001))
(defining “presence” as “a psychological state of subjective perception in which even
though part or all of an individual’s current experience is generated by and/or
filtered through human-made technology, part or all of the individual’s perception
fails to accurately acknowledge the role of the technology in the experience”).
44. Collins, supra note 9.
45. See, e.g., Sam Loveridge & Lily Prasuethsut, The Best Oculus Rift Games,
WAREABLE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.wareable.com/oculus-rift/the-best-oculus-riftgames (listing various Oculus Rift game titles spanning from science fiction, military
role playing, and sporting games).
46. See Sharma, supra note 2 (identifying Microsoft as the front runner in AR
technology based on its 175 inventions filed as patents, compared to second-place
Samsung with 140).
47. Terry Myerson, Opening Windows Holographic to Partners for a New Era of Mixed
Reality, MICROSOFT (June 1, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://blogs.windows.com/windowsex
perience/2016/06/01/opening-windows-holographic-to-partners-for-a-new-era-of-mixedreality (“Imagine wearing a VR device and seeing your physical hands as you
manipulate an object, working on the scanned 3D image of a real object, or bringing
in a holographic representation of another person into your virtual world so you can
collaborate.”).
48. See, e.g., Microsoft HoloLens, Microsoft HoloLens: Partners Make It Real,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzAwdBZ3KCQ
(providing examples of the various partner industries for Microsoft’s AR
technology).
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room.49 As these examples illustrate, the technology’s goal is to fully
integrate virtual and physical reality.
VR and AR stand on the cusp of pushing the world into a new
technological frontier, blurring the lines between the physical and
virtual worlds.50 Consequently, they present new questions within
intellectual property law, such as whether intellectual property
protection should extend to three-dimensional digital models.51
B. An Overview of Design Patent Protection
A design patent is only one form of federal protection for
intellectual property.
Federal law protects several forms of
intellectual property: copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and
patents.52 A copyright protects an author’s or artist’s work,53 a

49. See id.
50. See Myerson, supra note 47.
51. See Purow, supra note 10; Po Yi et al., Virtual Reality Creates Potential Real Legal
Issues, VENABLE (July 9, 2015), https://www.venable.com/virtual-reality-createspotentially-real-legal-issues-07-09-2015.
52. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 24–25 (6th ed. 2012) (summarizing the structure of U.S.
intellectual property rights protection). Federal trade secret protection is a recent
development; the Defend Trade Secrets Act was signed into law in May of 2016.
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376; see Eric
Goldman, The New “Defend Trade Secrets Act” Is the Biggest IP Development in Years,
FORBES (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/
04/28/the-new-defend-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years. This
Act provides a federal cause of action for a violation of trade secrets and does not
supplant state-law-based trade secret regimes; however, the federal law includes an ex
parte seizure provision that may present a benefit to the federal cause of action.
Sebastian Kaplan & Patrick Premo, The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Creates Federal
Jurisdiction for Trade Secret Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (May 23, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/23/defend-trade-secrets-act-2016-creates-fede
ral-jurisdiction-trade-secret-litigation/id=69245. There are other forms of state-lawbased intellectual property doctrines, including the right of publicity and various
contract-based protections. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra, at 1005–06 (describing
state law doctrines and how they supplement federal intellectual property regimes).
53. Well-known copyright infringement litigation has concerned literary works,
see, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(addressing author J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter book series); works of the visual arts,
see, e.g., Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 2–7, Whitmill v.
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) (concerning
boxer Mike Tyson’s famous tribal tattoo, which was used without the permission of
the artist, S. Victor Whitmill, in the film Hangover Part II); and works of musical
compositions and sound recordings, see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 572–74 (1994) (assessing the parody of Roy Orbison’s hit song “Oh, Pretty
Woman” in 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman”).
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trademark protects a company’s image in commerce,54 a trade secret
protects a company’s secret device or manufacturing process,55 and a
patent protects an invention.56 On their edges, these bodies of law
interact and overlap with each other.57
When issuing a patent, the federal government grants the inventors
a property right in their inventions.58 This property right grants the
right to exclude others from “making, using, offering for sale, selling
or importing the invention[]” within the United States, or importing
the invention into the United States.59 The USPTO is statutorily
authorized to issue three types of patents: (1) utility patents, (2) design
patents, and (3) plant patents.60 The most common type of patent is a
utility patent, which is granted for novel, useful, and nonobvious
inventions.61 In contrast, a design patent is granted for “any new,
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”62 The
third type of patent, a plant patent, is of much more limited use in that

54. Notable trademark infringement litigation has concerned Adidas’s famous
Three-Stripe mark used on a lookalike shoe sold by Payless, see Adidas-Am., Inc. v.
Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040–43 (D. Or. 2008), and the trade
dress—the commercial appearance—of taco restaurants, see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765–67 (1992).
55. Famous trade secret misappropriation litigation has involved one of DuPont’s
chemical manufacturing processes, see E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,
431 F.2d 1012, 1013–14 (5th Cir. 1970), and large-scale manufacturing machines, see
Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24–26, 40 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)
(rejecting an injunction for trade secrets involving papermaking machinery).
56. Prominent patent infringement litigation has included Samuel Morse’s
invention of the telegram, see O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62–67 (1853),
and smartphones, see Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1317–19 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
57. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 52, at 25.
58. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 11.
59. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); see also General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 11.
60. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 11. See generally Types of
Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offi
ces/ac/ido/oeip/taf/patdesc.htm (explaining the differences between utility, plant,
and design patents).
61. See Types of Patents, supra note 60; U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years
1963–2015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 15, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web
/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (showing that utility patents are the USPTO’s
most issued type of patent). An example of a utility patent is one issued for a pizza
box. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,441,626 (filed Dec. 14, 1981) (claiming a patent for
an improved pizza box).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
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it is granted to anyone who “invents or discovers and asexually
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.”63
There are key differences between a utility patent and a design
patent. First, a utility patent protects the way an article—the subject
matter of the invention or design—functions; a design patent
protects an article’s aesthetic appearance.64 Second, the term of a
utility patent is twenty years, while the term of a design patent is
fourteen or fifteen years.65 Third, although an inventor can file
multiple claims within a utility patent application, a design patent
application may only contain one claim.66 Finally, the pendency of
the prosecution for a utility patent is typically between twenty-five and
twenty-eight months,67 and the pendency of the prosecution for a
design patent is typically between seventeen and twenty months;68
therefore, the pendency of a typical design patent is six months to a
year shorter than that of a utility patent. Despite being less common
than a utility patent, the design patent is gaining popularity and
proving to be just as valuable in an intellectual property portfolio.69
Rather than protect the article itself, a design patent protects the
design “embodied in or applied to an article”; in other words, a

63. § 161. An example of a plant patent includes various varieties of corn. See,
e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,962,953 (filed May 2, 2013) (claiming “Plants and Seeds of a
Corn Variety”). Plant patents are the least common type of patent. U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart, supra note 61. Due to the inherent differences between plant patents
and design and utility patents, including the lack of an article of manufacture
requirement, this Comment does not discuss plant patents beyond this introduction.
64. MPEP § 1502.01 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015).
65. Id. § 1502.01(A). The exact term of the design patent depends on the filing
date: it is fifteen years if the patent was filed on or after May 13, 2015, and fourteen
years if filed before that date. Id.
66. Id. § 1502.01(C).
67. See Traditional Total Pendency, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/kpis/kpiOverallPendency.kpixml
(last visited Apr. 28, 2017). The USPTO defines pendency as “the average number of
months from the patent application filing date to the date the application has
reached final disposition (e.g., issued as a patent or abandoned).” Traditional Total
Pendency, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.:
DATA VISUALIZATION CTR.,
https://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
68. See
Design
Total
Pendency,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/kpis/kpi99.kpixml (last updated
Mar. 2017).
69. See Quinn, supra note 12; see also Haydn Shaughnessy, The Surprise Leader in
Design Patents, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/haydn
shaughnessy/2013/08/22/the-surprise-leader-in-design-patents (examining the race
between consumer electronics corporations to accumulate design patent rights).
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design patent protects the article’s aesthetic appearance.70 Because
copyright protection is not available for useful articles, Congress
passed design patent legislation to fill the gap between the copyright
protection available to artists and the patent protection available to
inventors.71 Accordingly, design patents protect the creative or
aesthetic features of a utilitarian product.72 As a result, a designer73
theoretically could protect the same design by both copyright and
design patent law.74 However, because the owner of a design patent is
granted an absolute right to exclude for a period of fourteen years,
Congress created strict statutory requirements to receive a design
patent grant from the USPTO.75
1.

A design patent claim
Unlike utility patents, which may contain multiple claimed
inventions, the USPTO restricts a design patent to a single claimed

70. MPEP § 1502; see also Ex parte Cady, 1916 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 62, 63 (stating
that “[t]he invention is not the article and is not the design per se, but is the design
applied”); Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents,
COLO. LAW., July 2009, at 71 (discussing the protection granted by a design patent).
71. See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.02 (2016) (documenting
the historical development that led to the design patent act); see also Jason J. Du
Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107, 111 (2013)
(providing a thorough dive into the foundational debate over whether to enact
design patent protection in the United States, and highlighting the holes between
copyright and utility patent protection at the time design patent protection was
being considered). The “useful article doctrine” of copyright law precludes
copyright protection for industrial designs that are not separable and independent
from the utilitarian parts of the article. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)
(reporting Congress’s intent to distinguish between “works of applied art,” which
receive copyright protection, and industrial designs, which do not receive copyright
protection, in passing the Copyright Act of 1976).
72. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 23.02.
73. The word “designer” is used to denote the “inventor” of a design patent, as
distinguished from an “inventor” of a utility patent.
74. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights:
Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 35, 80–81 (2010) (reviewing the
overlapping regimes of intellectual property and emphasizing the expanding view of
protectable subject matter).
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (enumerating the requirements to receive a design
patent); MPEP § 1504.01 (reviewing the jurisprudence interpreting the requirements
of § 171); see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 23.03 (detailing the requirements for
patenting a design). The owner of a copyright is given a longer period of protection,
which is typically the life of the author plus seventy years; however, because of the
longer period of protection, the right of a copyright owner is not absolute. MERGES
ET AL., supra note 52, at 26–27. The rights of others to use the copyrighted work
include, among other rights, fair use and independent creation. Id.
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design.76 Every patent application, utility or design, includes claims,
which establish the metes and bounds of the property right granted
in the patent.77 A patent grants the right to exclude others from
infringing on the enumerated claims.78 Unlike a utility patent, which
describes the claimed invention in words, a design patent describes
the claimed property right through drawings.79 Upon filing an
application at the USPTO, the designer must submit enough views of
the design to create “a complete disclosure” of the design’s
appearance.80 As seen in the examples below, the solid lines of a
design patent claim constitute the actual ornamental aspects of the
claimed design, while the dashed lines show the surrounding
environment, which is not part of the designer’s claim.81
Designs for both the early version of the iconic Coca-Cola bottle
(Figure 1) and the Nintendo Game Boy (Figure 2) include only solid
lines; therefore, the patents claimed the entire ornamental design of the
bottle and the game. A third example is the design of a pair of Oakley
sunglasses (Figure 3), which exemplifies the interplay of the solid and
dashed lines to show what is and is not claimed by the designer.

76. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (2012) (stating that “[m]ore than one claim is neither
required nor permitted”); see also MPEP § 1503.01(III) (outlining that “[a] design
patent application may only include a single claim”).
77. See Quinn, supra note 12 (conveying the basics of patent claims, including the
interplay between the claims and the specification of the patent).
78. Id.
79. Under certain circumstances, a design patent application may contain a
photograph in lieu of a drawing. See MPEP § 1503.02(V).
80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.152; MPEP § 1503.02.
81. See MPEP § 1503.02(III); see also Kugler & Mueller, supra note 70, at 75–76
(discussing the process of patent claiming through drawings for a design patent).
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conditions and requirements of this title.”87 Because § 171 is subject
to the “conditions and requirements” of Title 35 of the U.S. Code,
the Federal Circuit has looked to other sections of that title, such as
§ 102 and § 103, to interpret its scope.88
a.

The relationship between 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 171

Within Title 35 of the U.S. Code, § 171 for design patents is analogous
to § 101, which defines the patentable subject matter for a utility
patent.89 Section 101 reads, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”90
Section 171 differs in two ways from the statutory requirements to
receive a utility patent under § 101. First, § 171 does not use the word
“useful,” and second, § 171 includes the word “original” to distinguish a
design from a utility patent.91 In its analysis of the overall structure of
the design patent statutory scheme, the Federal Circuit has explained
that the “newness” and “originality” requirements of § 171 import the
requirements of § 102 (novelty) and § 103 (nonobviousness) because
§ 171 states that the statutory provision is subject to the “conditions and
requirements of this title.”92
b.

The novelty, nonobvious, and ornamentality requirements of § 171

Given this relationship between § 171 and § 101, the first three
requirements for design patents are relatively straightforward. First,
§ 171 requires that the claimed design is novel, which means that no

87. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
88. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); see also Seymour & Andrew W. Torrance, (R)evolution in Design Patentable
Subject Matter: The Shifting Meaning of “Article of Manufacture”, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
183, 187–88 (2013).
89. See MPEP § 1502.01 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (distinguishing utility patents
from design patents).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
91. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1238.
92. Id.; see also Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 187–88. According to the
Federal Circuit, “[t]he originality requirement in § 171 dates back to 1842 when
Congress enacted the first design patent law.” Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at
1238. The court went on to emphasize that § 171 was therefore likely to incorporate
the originality requirement of copyright law: “requiring that the work be original
with the author.” Id.
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prior art discloses the same design.93 Prior art is the collection of
previous designs known to the public as defined by § 102.94 In
Gorham Co. v. White,95 the Supreme Court outlined the test for design
novelty—the “ordinary observer” test.96 This test finds a design
anticipated, or not novel, if an “ordinary observer” could mistake that
design with another design that preceded it.97
Second, courts interpret § 171 to require that the design is
nonobvious, which designers establish by exercising “inventive or
originative faculty.”98 In International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens
Corp.,99 the Federal Circuit outlined the two-pronged test for
nonobviousness.100 In the first prong, one having “ordinary skill in
the art”101 determines “whether to combine earlier [prior art]
references to arrive at a single piece of art for comparison with the
potential design or to modify a single prior art reference.”102 After
establishing this reference, the finder-of-fact applies the second
prong by using novelty’s “ordinary observer” test to compare the
formulated reference from the first prong to the design seeking
patent protection.103 In other words, after one having ordinary skill
in the art establishes an objective prior art reference, the finder-offact determines whether an “ordinary observer” would find the
formulated design substantially similar to the design seeking
93. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 23.03[5] (outlining the design patent statutory
requirement of novelty).
94. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing, in part, that an inventor may claim a patent
unless “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date
of the” patent claim).
95. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871).
96. Id. at 528.
97. See id. (“[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be
the other . . . .”).
98. Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893).
99. 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
100. Id. at 1240.
101. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 5.04A[1] (surveying the contours of patent
law’s “person having ordinary skill in the art,” including how the “person” is
formulated); 8 id., § 23.03[6][a].
102. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1240. By creating this first step in
establishing nonobviousness, the court implemented a standard that permitted
objective evidence from expert testimony from designers in the field. See In re
Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216–17 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (reviewing the reasoning
behind the objective determination of one having ordinary skill in the art).
103. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1240.
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protection; if they are found similar, then the design is obvious and
thus not patentable.104
Third, the claimed design meets the ornamentality requirement when
it creates “a more pleasing experience” than the prior art.105 In Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,106 the Supreme Court explained
that “a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is
not dictated by function alone.”107 Therefore, some measure of pleasing
appearance is required to receive a design patent.108 The scope of
§ 171’s final requirement, however, is not so clear.
C. The Design Patent Article of Manufacture Requirement of § 171
The final requirement to receive a design patent is that the design
is “for an article of manufacture.”109 Over time, Congress has
modified the text of this requirement within the design patent
statute, and the courts have expanded their interpretation.110
1.

The changing language of § 171
The article of manufacture requirement has been part of the
statute since its initial passage.111 However, through various revisions,
Congress simplified the text of the requirement. When originally
enacted in 1842, the design patent statute granted design patents for
the following categories:
[(1)] any . . . design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other
material or materials, . . . [(2)] design for the printing of woollen,
silk, cotton, or other fabrics, . . . [(3)] design for a bust, statute, or

104. See id. at 1240, 1243–44.
105. MERGES ET AL., supra note 52, at 424.
106. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
107. Id. at 148. The Court likely adopted this position from the predecessor to the
Federal Circuit, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), which
described the requirement as met when a design “possess[ed] more grace and pleasing
appearance” than a prior art. In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
108. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148; Koehring, 37 F.2d at 422 (clarifying that the
pleasing appearance is not confined to the beauty in the “aesthetics or fine arts”).
But see Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 189 (quoting Contico Int’l, Inc. v.
Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 1981)) (arguing
that the ornamentality requirement that the Supreme Court set in Bonito Boats has
been abandoned by the lower courts, including the Federal Circuit, and that some
courts have held that the design must merely be considered “not ugly . . . when
compared to prior designs”).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
110. See infra Sections I.C.1–2 (explaining the shifting language of § 171 and how
courts interpret that language).
111. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
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bas relief or composition in alto or basso relievo, or [(4)] any . . .
impression or ornament, or . . . [(5)] any . . . pattern, or print, or
picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or
painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture,
or [(6)] any . . . shape or configuration of any article of
manufacture not known or used by others . . . .112

Subsequently, Congress revised the statute in 1870 to include the
following subject matters:
[(1)] design for a manufacture, bust, statue, alto-relievo, or basrelief; . . . [(2)] design for the printing of wool[l]en, silk, cotton, or
other fabrics; . . . [(3)] impression, ornament, pattern print, or
picture, to be printed, painted, cast, or otherwise placed on or
worked into any article of manufacture; or . . . [(4)] shape or
configuration of any article of manufacture . . . .113

Ultimately, in 1902, Congress arrived at the statute’s current
wording by amending the statute to read solely “design for an article
of manufacture.”114 At the time, the USPTO interpreted the change
as a simplification of the language of the statute and not as a
limitation of the previous enumeration of patentable subjects.115
Although amended twice more in 1939 and 1952, the design patent
statute’s wording of the article of manufacture requirement has
stayed the same.116
2.

Early court interpretations of § 171
While design patents initially protected smaller, tangible items,
such as statues and industrial designs,117 in the early twentieth
century, the courts began to interpret the article of manufacture
requirement more broadly. In In re Hadden,118 the Court of Appeals

112. Id.; see also In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (describing the
original design patent statute).
113. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 210; see also Schnell, 46 F.2d at
205 (quoting the 1870 Act).
114. Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193, 193; see also Seymour & Torrance,
supra note 88, at 192 (indicating that when Congress amended the 1902 Act, the
legislature simplified the language for the patentability requirements).
115. See Schnell, 46 F.2d at 205 (“Congress did not, in amending the act in 1902,
intend to omit as proper subjects for a design patent—any new and original
impression, ornament, patent, print, or picture to be printed, painted, cast, or
otherwise placed on or worked into any article of manufacture.” (quoting Ex parte
Fulda, 1913 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 206, 207)).
116. Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 192.
117. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543, 544 (including protection for, inter
alia, a “design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or composition in alto or basso relievo”).
118. 20 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
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for the District of Columbia (now known as the D.C. Circuit) faced a
novel question on appeal from the USPTO: whether a designer may
claim a patent for a life-sized grandstand.119 The USPTO had decided
that the grandstand, while a “manufacture” within the meaning of the
utility patent statute, was not an “article of manufacture” within the
meaning of the design patent statute; it cautioned that an observer
would not be aware of the grandstand’s ornamental features because
of its size and immobility.120 However, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the
USPTO’s distinction between a “manufacture” and an “article of
manufacture,” finding it nearly impossible to distinguish between the
two.121 The court ultimately incorporated the accepted meaning of
“manufacture” from the utility patent statute into the design patent
statute’s article of manufacture requirement.122 The court’s holding
that size and immobility are not dispositive characteristics thus
broadened the term’s accepted meaning.123
Shifting away from the tangible, typical design, in In re Hruby124 the
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) interpreted the
scope of an article of manufacture to include the ornamental display
of a fountain.125 During examination at the USPTO, the designer
claimed the following fountain:

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 275.
Id. at 275–76.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. (citing Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699, 702 (3d Cir. 1913)).
373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
Id. at 998–99.
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Figgure 4: Hrubby Design Pateent Claim126
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Second, the court reaffirmed the holding in Hadden that size and
immobility do not create unpatentable subject matter.132 Finally, the
court rejected the argument that the water sprays did not constitute
an article of manufacture because they could not “exist of
themselves.”133 Specifically, the CCPA held that “the dependence of
the existence of a design on something outside itself is [not] a reason
for holding it is not a design ‘for an article of manufacture.’”134 The
court emphasized that many designs depend on outside factors for
their outward appearance.135 Thus, the CCPA held that under the
design patent statute, an “article of manufacture” might be intangible
and dependent upon another object. This was the last time that the
CCPA or its successor, the Federal Circuit, heard a case that required
a plain text interpretation of § 171’s article of manufacture
requirement; however, following the advent of computers, the
USPTO had to consider whether software icons were within the scope
of the requirement.136
3.

Design patent protection and software
Design patents and software had their first encounter at the
USPTO as companies began to create and use software icons.137 In
the 1980s, computer-generated graphics and icons burgeoned onto
the design scene.138 Around the same time, the Xerox Corporation
(“Xerox”) broke new ground at the USPTO by filing design patent
applications for its computer icons.139 Ultimately, the USPTO issued
Xerox design patent protection based on some of its initial

132. Id. at 1000 (reaffirming Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699 (3d Cir.
1913), the basis of the Hadden court’s holding); see also supra text accompanying
notes 118–23 (detailing the CCPA’s reasoning for its holding in Hadden).
133. Hruby, 373 F.2d at 1001.
134. Id.
135. Examples of designs that depend on outside factors for their ultimate
appearance include (1) a lampshade dependent upon the lightbulb being turned
on; (2) a woman’s hosiery dependent upon a woman’s legs; (3) inflated articles, such
as balloons, air mattresses, and pool floats; and (4) wallpaper that requires being
placed on the wall for a full understanding of the design. Id.
136. See Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 203–04 (detailing the USPTO’s
extension of design patent grants to software icons).
137. Id. at 200.
138. Id.
139. Lance L. Vietzke, Software as the Article of Manufacture in Design Patents for Icons,
21 AIPLA Q.J. 138, 146 (1993).
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142. See
S Vietzke, suprra note 139, at 146–47.
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p
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144. Vietzke,
V
supra note
n
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7.
145. No.
N 92-0623, 26
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BNA) 1259, 12660 (B.P.A.I. Aprr. 2, 1992).
146. Id.
I at 1261 n.1.
147. Id.
I at 1261.
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computer system.”148
Further, to pass the § 171 article of
manufacture requirement, Xerox identified the computer as the
article of manufacture.149 The examiner ultimately rejected the
application because it did not include a depiction or description of
the computer itself in the application.150 On appeal from the
examiner, the Board upheld the rejection.151 The Board explained
that merely presenting a picture on a computer’s display does not
constitute a protectable design; rather, it is solely because “the icon is
an integral part of the operation of a programmed computer” that
the potential for patentability exists.152
Although the Board’s view in Strijland withstood opposition at the
USPTO, subsequent challengers chipped away at its stronghold. In
Ex parte Tayama,153 the Board appeared open to expanding protection
to software icons.154 The designer claimed the “ornamental design

148. Id.
149. Id. at 1265.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1261. The Board also used the same reasoning in Ex parte Donaldson,
No. 92-0546, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1250, 1251 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 2, 1992). In both
opinions, the Board repeats large portions of text, further evidencing that these cases
were decided simultaneously. Compare, e.g., Donaldson, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1257 (“The
phrase ‘design for an article of manufacture’ has long appeared in the design
statutes.”), with Strijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1261 (same).
A simplified explanation of the USPTO appeals process is as follows: Upon an
adverse decision on patentability from an examiner, the appellee must file a notice
of appeal and submit an appeal brief to the Board. Appeals, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trialand-appeal-board/appeals. The examiner who reviewed the initial application then
files an answer to the Board. Id. Upon review of the briefs, and after an oral
hearing, if granted, the Board issues its decision. Id. For a more detailed overview of
the ex parte appeals process at the USPTO, see William F. Smith, An Overview of Ex
Parte Patent Appeals in the USPTO, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (June 15, 2016),
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/PTABBenchAndBar2016/PTAB%202016%20
Bench%20%20Bar%20Conference/Walters_Paper.pdf.
152. Strijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1263.
153. No. 1992-0624, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 2, 1992).
154. Specifically, the Board indicated that software icons might fall within the
scope of the article of manufacture requirement:
We have no doubt that the claimed design, like all surface ornamentationtype designs, could be used to ornament a wide variety of articles, including
computers. However, the phrase “design for an article of manufacture” in
§ 171 requires more than a depiction of the surface ornamentation alone. It
requires disclosure of the ornamentation applied to or embodied in an
article of manufacture. More than an applicant’s generalized intent to
ornament some article is required. It is the application of the design to an
article which separates mere pictures from a design protectable by a patent.
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for an icon for set up operation,”155 arguing that the icon was “surface
ornamentation upon a computer system.”156 This line of argument
aimed to establish the computer as the article of manufacture
required by § 171.157 In accord with the logic in Strijland, the Board
upheld the rejection because the specification failed to “show or
describe” Tayama’s “claimed design embodied in any article of
manufacture.”158 Again, the Board reiterated that “a picture standing
alone is not protectable by a design patent.”159 However, similar to
Strijland, the Board hinted that if Tayama had included the computer
in the application, the icon may have been patentable.160
After witnessing the failures of Xerox, attorneys used the CCPA’s
holding in Hruby to analogize to the characteristics of Hruby’s
fountain to those of a software icon. In Ex parte Donoghue,161 the
designer injected the logic of the Hruby court—which held that
dependency, ephemerality, and permanence do not preclude design
patentability—to argue to the Board that the icon design depended
upon the computer system that did not need to be disclosed in the
application.162 The Board rejected this argument, distinguishing the
claimed icon as a claim of surface ornamentation and the fountain in
Hruby as an applied design.163 Because an icon is a form of surface
ornamentation, the ornamentation must, to receive a design patent,
be applied to an article of manufacture; Donoghue failed to do so in
her application.164

Without disclosure of an article, the design is not an applied design
contemplated for protection under § 171.
Id. at 1617.
155. Id. at 1615 n.2.
156. Id. at 1617.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1616.
160. See id. at 1616–17.
161. No. 92-0539, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 2, 1992).
162. Id. at 1270.
163. Id. The Board explained the difference between an abstract design and an
applied design:
While the design must be embodied in some article, the statute is not limited
to designs for complete articles, or ‘discrete’ articles, and certainly not to
articles separately sold. . . . Here the design is embodied in the shank
portion of a drill and a drill is unquestionably an article of manufacture. It is
thus applied design as distinguished from abstract design.
Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
164. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.152 to emphasize the requirement that the designer
discloses the article of manufacture to which the design is applied).
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Following the Board’s decisions in Strijland, Tayama, and Donoghue,
the USPTO changed course by expanding design patent protection to
software icons and by publishing interim guidelines for examining
design patent applications for software icons.165 In response to the
Board’s concern, the interim guidelines required the designer to
include solid lines around the software icon to represent the computer’s
display, thereby ensuring compliance with the article of manufacture
requirement.166 In 1996, the USPTO finalized its regulations, which are
now incorporated into the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) and permit the computer display to be illustrated by either solid
or dashed lines.167 Within the MPEP, the USPTO cites Hruby to justify
the broadening of the article of manufacture requirement to include
software icons.168 According to the MPEP, “[t]he dependence of a
computer-generated icon on a central processing unit and computer
program for its existence itself is not a reason for holding that the design
is not for an article of manufacture.”169 At issue in Strijland, Tayama, and
Donoghue was whether the claimed icon should be viewed as a claim of
surface ornamentation or an actual applied design, like the fountain in
Hruby; however, the USPTO dropped this distinction seemingly without
any explanation.170 Even after the issue of the article of manufacture
requirement has been raised in cases before the Board, and ultimately
addressed in the MPEP, the Federal Circuit has never heard the
question of the scope of design patent eligibility under § 171.171
4. The Federal Circuit’s modern interpretation of the article of manufacture
requirement
Although the Federal Circuit has not ruled on the USPTO’s broad
interpretation of § 171’s article of manufacture requirement, the court
165. See Interim Guidelines for Examination of Design Patent Applications for
Computer-Generated Icons, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,170 (Oct. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Interim
Guidelines]; see also Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 204 (emphasizing that
the USPTO “abruptly changed” its design patent application review policy).
166. Interim Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. at 52,170.
167. Guidelines for Examination of Design Patent Applications for ComputerGenerated Icons, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,381 (Mar. 20, 1996); see also MPEP
§ 1504.01(a) (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008).
168. See MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I)(A) (citing In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1001
(C.C.P.A. 1967)).
169. Id.
170. See id.; see also Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 205 (highlighting that
neither the guidelines nor the MPEP explain why the distinction was “abandoned”).
171. Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 203–04 (pointing out the absence of
an appeal to the Federal Circuit). For a discussion of more recent district court cases
on software icons, see id. at 205–06.

BOULE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1140

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/5/2017 3:56 PM

[Vol. 66:1113

has heard at least two cases interpreting similar “manufacture”
requirements in related statutes. The first case, In re Nuijten,172 involved
the scope of utility patent subject matter under § 101 and was decided in
2007;173 the second case, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade
Commission,174 involved the jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)175 and was decided in
2015 with its en banc rehearing denied in March 2016.176
In Nuijten, the Federal Circuit decided that a “watermarked” signal
does not constitute subject matter for a utility patent, consequently
falling outside the scope of § 101.177 Watermarking is a technique
that embeds an electronic signal with additional data.178 For
example, the watermarking technique is used on digital audio files to
prevent unauthorized copying.179 The inventor attempted to patent
four types of claims relating to the watermarked signals: (1) the
process, (2) the device that performs the process, (3) the storage
medium that holds the resulting signals, and (4) the signals
themselves.180 The USPTO granted the first three categories of
172. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
173. Id. at 1348.
174. 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (per curiam).
175. Id. at 1286. The ITC “is an independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with
broad investigative responsibilities on matters of trade.” About the USITC, U.S. INT’L
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited
Apr. 28, 2017). Though vital in enforcing a patent-owner’s rights against potential
international infringers, specific workings of the ITC and its special remedies are
outside the scope of this Comment. This Comment looks to the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the term “manufacture” as used within § 337 of the ITC’s
controlling statute.
176. ClearCorrect, 819 F.3d at 1334, 1337.
177. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), which expanded the
Court’s § 101 subject matter test from Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), to software patents, it is unclear how the Court
would treat the watermarked electronic signal in Nuijten. The two-step framework to
evaluate patentable subject matter under § 101 has created significant uncertainty in the
software world. See Rajit Kapur et al., Certain Uncertainty: The Future of Computer Software
Patents,
BANNER
&
WITCOFF:
IP
UPDATE
(Fall/Winter
2015),
http://documents.lexology.com/23c2aaab-8c47-4964-910a-6bb69dd13809.pdf.
Certain-Uncertainty.The-Future-of-Computer-Software-Patents.pdf. The court’s analysis
in Nuijten, despite being decided seven years prior to Alice, still sheds light on how the
court may analyze three-dimensional digital models because the subject matter of
Nuijten involved a manipulated electronic signal. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348.
178. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1351.
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claims and rejected the fourth claim—the actual watermarked
signal.181 First, the Board found that the signal had no “physical
attributes,” and the claim solely described its abstract
characteristics.182 Second, the signal did not fall into any of the four
categories of patentable subject matter outlined in § 101—“process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”183 Third, the
Board found that the signal was not a tangible object and thus failed
to meet the definition of “manufacture.”184
In its analysis, the court dealt with the first ground of the Board’s
rejection, ruling that the claim should be construed as claiming the
signal itself.185 The court found that the signal had physical attributes
and thus was not a claim for solely the abstract characteristics of the
signal.186 Next, the court turned to an analysis of whether the signal
fit into the statutory subject matter of § 101.187 After rejecting the
signal as either a process or a machine, the court turned its attention
to the category of a manufacture.188 Upon facing this difficult
question, the court examined the Supreme Court’s landmark case
interpreting the breadth of § 101, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,189 for
guidance on the meaning of “manufacture.”190 In Chakrabarty, the
Court interpreted the term “manufacture” (in its verb form) very
broadly, citing legislative history and Congress’s use of broad
language as evidence that Congress recognized that some “inventions
are often unforeseeable.”191 In Nuijten, however, the Federal Circuit
construed “manufacture” as a noun rather than a verb and defined
the term using the same dictionary the Supreme Court used in
Chakrabarty.192 Ultimately, the court equated “manufacture,” used in
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1351–52.
183. Id. at 1352 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1353 (quoting Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (“The view that there is nothing necessarily
physical about ‘signals’ is incorrect.”).
186. Id. (explaining that a “signal” transports information via some physical carrier).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1356.
189. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
190. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356.
191. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09, 316 (citing the history of the first Patent Act,
including thoughts of the author, Thomas Jefferson, that defined statutory subject
matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new or useful improvement” (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat.
318, 319)).
192. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356.
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noun form, to an “article of manufacture,” and found that the term
referred to “tangible articles or commodities.”193 Subsequently, while
finding the signal physical, the court held that, as defined by the
claim, the signals did not comprise a tangible article.194 Thus, the
court found that the claimed signals did not meet the meaning of
“manufacture” in § 101.195
In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Linn raised the issue of a
potential contradiction of the majority’s interpretation of
“manufacture” in Nuijten with the CCPA’s previous interpretation of
“article of manufacture” in Hruby.196 Attempting to elucidate the
potential contradiction, the majority distinguished Nuijten from Hruby
in a footnote, emphasizing that this interpretation of “article of
manufacture” was limited to a utility patent under § 101 and that this
case did not affect the “article of manufacture” for the patentability
of designs under § 171.197
The Federal Circuit returned to the term “article” in ClearCorrect,
interpreting the phrase within 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) to determine
whether the ITC had jurisdiction.198 This case dealt with importing
three-dimensional digital models of orthodontic aligners.199 Align
Technology, Inc. (“Align”) alleged that ClearCorrect Operating
(“ClearCorrect”) violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (“section 337”) on a
theory of patent infringement.200 The orthodontic aligners at issue
were designed to incrementally reposition a patient’s teeth.201
ClearCorrect scanned patients’ teeth in the United States and sent
the three-dimensional models to its Pakistan office, which then
created the incremental positioning scheme for the teeth.202 After
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1357.
196. See id. at 1358, 1360 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing
that a “signal” is not necessarily transitory and “may last indefinitely”).
197. Id. at 1357 n.9 (majority opinion).
198. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(disagreeing with “[t]he Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its
jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data”).
199. Id. at 1287.
200. Id. During the litigation, Align alleged infringement of various claims over
seven different patents: (1) U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325; (2) U.S. Patent No. 6,705,863;
(3) U.S. Patent No. 6,626,666; (4) U.S. Patent No. 8,070,487; (5) U.S. Patent No.
6,471,511; (6) U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880; and (7) U.S. Patent No. 7,134,874. Id. at
1287 n.3.
201. Id. at 1287.
202. Id.
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the positioning scheme was complete, the Pakistan office sent the
three-dimensional models back to the United States, where
employees subsequently printed the models to use to mold the
orthodontic aligners.203 As set by section 337, the ITC’s jurisdiction is
limited to “unfair acts” involving the “importation of articles.”204
Thus, to establish jurisdiction, the ITC had to determine that the
three-dimensional digital models constituted an “article” within the
meaning of section 337. Accordingly, the ITC determined that the
use of “articles” within section 337 included digital data.205
The Federal Circuit reversed the ITC and held that the meaning of
“articles” only extends to “material things” and thus does not extend
to three-dimensional digital models.206 To determine the meaning of
“articles,” the court walked through four phases of statutory analysis:
first, construing the term in its ordinary meaning; second, turning to
the term’s use throughout section 337; third, looking at the full
statutory scheme; and fourth, examining the statute’s legislative
history.207 In the first phase of analysis, the court surveyed numerous
dictionaries contemporaneous to the passage of section 337’s
predecessor in which Congress initially used the phrase “articles.”208
Upon review of the dictionaries, the court maintained that “articles”
meant solely material things, and the term did not extend to
intangible articles.209 Consequently, the court concluded that an
“article” did not include electronically transmitted three-dimensional
digital models.210 In the second phase, the court found that the
structure of section 337 reinforced the conclusion that Congress

203. Id.
204. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1298–99
(addressing the boundaries of the ITC’s jurisdiction by examining the legislative
history of the Tariff Act).
205. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1299 (discussing the ITC’s argument “that the use
of the word ‘commerce’ indicates that ‘articles’ should be read broadly”); see also
Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 4555 (May 6, 2013) (Final)
(recommending the issue of cease and desist orders to ClearCorrect concerning six
infringed patents of Align).
206. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1290.
207. See id. at 1290–99.
208. See id. at 1291–94.
209. Id. at 1293–94.
210. See id. (emphasizing that it is “clear that the ordinary meaning of the term
‘articles’ is ‘material things’”). The court surveyed a total of eleven dictionaries
during this discussion; these dictionaries included the contemporaneous edition of
Webster’s at the time the 1922 Tariff Act was passed, industry specific dictionaries,
and various editions of Black’s Law Dictionary. See id. at 1291–93, 1298–99.
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intended for “articles” to mean material things.211 Here, the court
focused on the exclusionary purpose of section 337.212 Because the
purpose of the act is to prevent items that infringe intellectual
property from entering the United States, the fact that it was
impracticable to stop electronic transmission would make the statute
unenforceable.213 As a result of this analysis, the court rejected
Align’s invitation to read section 337 broadly enough to encompass
electronic signals.214
The third and fourth phases of analysis continued along the same
lines as the initial two. In the third phase of its statutory analysis, the
court found no help in the statutory scheme to include a digital
model within the meaning of an article.215 Whether considering
exclusion orders, cease and desist orders, or tariff schedules, the court
concluded that each was directed at the regulation of material things
and not the transmission of digital data.216 Finally, the court examined
the legislative history of section 337.217 In its decision below, the ITC
posited that, because Congress used a variety of words to describe
“articles,” the legislative history indicated that the word should be read
more broadly than “material things.”218 However, the court emphasized
that Congress “unambiguously” intended that the meaning of “articles”
only extend to “material things.”219 The court ultimately concluded
that Congress, rather than the ITC, was in a better position to
determine what should be included in the statute as an “article.”220
In a vehement dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority’s
holding was contrary to the purpose of section 337 and conflicted
211. Id. at 1294 (rationalizing that “if ‘articles’ had a broader definition,
numerous subsections would be rendered inoperative”).
212. See id. at 1295.
213. Id. (“By way of example, digital transmissions from satellites do not move
through border crossings, nor can they be stopped at our borders via any
enforcement mechanism contemplated in the statutory scheme.”).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1296–98.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 1298.
218. See id. at 1298–99. The ITC pointed out that the words “goods” and
“commerce” were used synonymously with the word “articles” within the legislative
history. Id.
219. Id. at 1299 (determining that “articles” does not encompass “electronically
transmitted digital data”).
220. Id. at 1302. To determine the appropriate deference to give the ITC, the court
performed the two-step analysis as outlined in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1290, 1299–1300.
The court determined it owed no deference to the ITC’s findings. Id. at 1301–02.

BOULE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

REDEFINING REALITY

5/5/2017 3:56 PM

1145

with binding precedent and other judicial bodies.221 She submitted
that the Information Age changed the technology world and that, to
serve its statutory purpose, section 337 needed to evolve to facilitate
remedies against modern unfair competition.222 Judge Newman
emphasized that section 337 was meant to apply “to all patented
technologies, including digital technologies, whatever the path of
importation.”223 Further, she rejected the tangible limitation on
“articles” within the meaning of section 337,224 contending that
Congress could not have intended to omit future technologies it
could not foresee when it enacted the statute as well as the majority’s
read-in limitation.225
Following their defeat, Align and the ITC each filed petitions for
an en banc rehearing; both petitions were denied.226 However, the
panel’s split, and its fervor, persisted in the denial of the en banc
petition for a rehearing.227
II. VIRTUAL AND AUGMENTED REALITY: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
CRASH COURSE WITH THE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE NEED FOR A BROAD
INTERPRETATION OF § 171
The maturity and rapid growth of the VR and AR markets are
blurring the lines between the physical and digital words, and more
designers in these markets will seek design patent protection.
Therefore, whether a three-dimensional digital model constitutes an
“article of manufacture” within the meaning of § 171 is likely to
become a much-debated topic. Congress’s simplification of the
221. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This holding is
contrary to Section 337, and conflicts with rulings of the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of International Trade,
the International Trade Commission, the Customs authorities, and the Department
of Labor.”).
222. See id.
223. Id. at 1307.
224. Id. at 1308 (“Unquestionably, Congress meant . . . to include under the word
‘articles’ any provided-for substance, material or thing of whatever kind or character
that was imported into this country.” (quoting United States v. Eimer & Amend, 28
C.C.P.A. 10, 12 (1940))).
225. Id.
226. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (denying en banc rehearing).
227. See id. at 1337 (Newman, J., dissenting). After the Federal Circuit issued its
adverse decision, Align and the ITC chose not to seek certiorari at the Supreme
Court. Kirk Sigmon et al., ClearCorrect v. ITC: No Supreme Court Review, MORRISON &
FOERSTER LLP: MOFO @ ITC (Sept. 7, 2016), http://mofoatitc.mofo.com/federalcircuit-decisions-re-itc/clearcorrect-v-itc-no-supreme-court-review.
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statutory text of § 171 and the CCPA’s and USPTO’s most recent
direct interpretations of § 171’s article of manufacture requirement
support a broad interpretation of the phrase “an article of
manufacture” that includes three-dimensional digital models.228
Based on this interpretation, the USPTO should grant design patents
to three-dimensional digital models.229 In two recent cases, however,
the Federal Circuit has signaled a narrowing of the scope of the
“article of manufacture” language and has explicitly excluded
electronic and digital technologies.230 While the court arguably
respects the plain language meaning of these terms at the time
Congress enacted these statutes, its refusal to expand the scope of the
article of manufacture requirement does so at the expense of
congressional intent evidenced by the design patent statute’s
legislative history.
A. The Federal Circuit Has Signaled a Limitation on Statutory Subject
Matter by Adopting a Narrow Meaning of an “Article of Manufacture” in a
Statute Related to the Design Patent Statute
In its two most recent decisions interpreting the phrase “article of
manufacture,” the Federal Circuit has signaled a much narrower view
than that held by its predecessor court—the CCPA—and the
USPTO.231 In Nuijten, the court indicated that it holds a narrow view
of the definition of an article of manufacture.232 In ClearCorrect, the
Federal Circuit confirmed this view, holding the same limited view of

228. See infra Sections II.A–B (explaining the furtherance of an inclusive subject
matter policy in § 171 of the design patent statute from overall simplification of the
article of manufacture requirement, legislative history, and case law).
229. See infra Section II.C.
230. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1299 (refusing to include three-dimensional
digital models within the meaning of an “article of manufacture”); In re Nuijten, 500
F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing to include watermarked electronic signals
within the meaning of an “article of manufacture”); infra Section II.A
(acknowledging the Federal Circuit’s limited holding of “articles of manufacture” to
the physical realm).
231. See In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1001–02 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (finding a broad view
of an article of manufacture); MPEP § 1504.01(a) (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015)
(permitting design patents for software icons); see also infra Sections II.C.2–3
(discussing the change in the USPTO and courts’ interpretation of an article of
manufacture).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 186–95 (identifying the Federal Circuit’s
limitation of the definition of “manufacture” when analyzing whether a watermarked
electronic signal is patentable subject matter under § 101).
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an article of manufacture as in Nuijten.233 Further, ClearCorrect
continues to evince the court’s willingness to limit the definition of
an article of manufacture to the physical world.234
The narrow definition of “manufacture” in In re Nuijten
The Federal Circuit departed from a broad reading of the article of
manufacture requirement in Nuijten.235
In Nuijten, the court
narrowed the definition of a “manufacture” in its interpretation of
§ 101, the same statutory provision that the Supreme Court
interpreted in Chakrabarty.236 Because it interpreted “manufacture” in
§ 101 to be a noun, the court denied patent protection for a
watermarked electrical signal because the signal was “fleeting”;
“devoid of any semblance of permanence”; and dependent on a
machine to be “perceived.”237 Given the close relationship between
§ 101 and § 171 and the Federal Circuit’s willingness to import
meanings derived from the utility patent statute into the design
patent statute, the court could import the narrowed meaning of
manufacture into its interpretation of § 171.238
The characteristics of Nuijten’s electronic signal that the court
identified as precluding utility patentability are similar to the
characteristics of the Hruby fountain, which the CCPA upheld as
patentable. Specifically, the Federal Circuit described Nuijten’s
electronic signal as “fleeting,” “devoid of any semblance of
permanence,” and dependent on a machine to be “perceived,”239
while the CCPA described the particles that made up Hruby’s
fountain as “fleeting,” and found that the fountain itself lacked
“permanence” and was “dependen[t]” on the flow of water.240
Despite these similar characteristics, however, the two courts did not
1.

233. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the court’s determination that a threedimensional model did not meet the definition of “article” under the statute).
234. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1286 (concluding that “articles” means “material
things” and that any expansion of this interpretation should be left to Congress).
235. See supra Section I.C.4 (providing an overview of the Federal Circuits decision
in Nuijten and emphasizing the court’s departure from the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of patentable subject matter set by § 101).
236. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
237. See id. at 1356–57; supra text accompanying notes 190–93 (explaining the
decision to read “manufacture” as a noun rather than a verb to narrow the definition
of the term).
238. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (noting that courts have interpreted the requirements of design patents in
line with those of utility patents).
239. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356–57.
240. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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come to the same conclusions. While the CCPA in Hruby held that
tangibility, dependence, and permanence did not preclude a design
from patentability, the Federal Circuit in Nuijten held that these
characteristics did preclude patentability.241
Judge Linn, in his concurrence and dissent in Nuijten, pointed out the
inconsistency of the Federal Circuit’s decision to interpret the word
“manufacture” in the utility patent context differently than it had in the
design patent context in Hruby.242 He stated that, “In In re Hruby, we
held that it was not the dynamic position of any given water droplet, but
rather the overall pattern, that was patentable; likewise, here, it is the
overall signal, not the physical manifestation of a single bit, that
constitutes the invention.”243 To counter Judge Linn’s point, the
majority argued that because requirements for patentability differed in
the utility and design realms, there would not be a contradiction issue.244
Nevertheless, the court appears to ignore the fact that the requirements
for patentability—novelty, obviousness, and subject matter—are
independent from each other.245 Consequently, because the design and
utility patent statutes have an independent subject matter requirement
that includes the word “manufacture,” it is immaterial to point out that
there are other, dissimilar requirements.246 The court’s jurisprudence,
which imports utility patent concepts and interpretations into the design
patent statute, further underscores the argument that the limited
meaning of “manufacture” could likely be imported into the
interpretation of § 171.247
Because of § 171’s language subjecting it to other “conditions and
requirements” of Title 35, the Federal Circuit has freely imported the
statutory interpretation of utility patent requirements into the

241. See id. at 999–1001; supra text accompanying notes 128–35 (examining the
CCPA’s reasoning for not finding these factors dispositive in determining whether a
design was patentable under § 171).
242. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1360 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
243. Id. (citation omitted).
244. Id. at 1357 n.9 (majority opinion) (“Hruby dealt with a 35 U.S.C. § 171 design
patent for an aesthetically pleasing water fountain rather than a § 101 utility patent,
and is therefore of limited applicability to this case. The subject of a design patent
need not have any practical utility. Compare § 101 (‘new and useful’), with § 171
(‘new . . . and ornamental’).”).
245. See Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 199 (identifying the inconsistency
between the majority’s statement in footnote nine and the statutory requirements for
design patentability).
246. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 171 (2012); Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 199.
247. See supra Section I.B.2.a (identifying the courts’ willingness to import utility
patent statutory provisions into interpretations of design patent law).
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requirements for design patentability.248 Thus, given the similarity of
the wording between the subject matter requirements for design and
utility patents, the design patent statute’s grant permitting the
importation of utility patent requirements, and the court’s history of
actually importing these requirements, it is extremely likely that,
given the invitation, the Federal Circuit would import Nuijten’s
manufacture requirement into the design patent statute. This
importation would necessarily overturn Hruby.249
There are many similarities between the watermarked signal in
Nuijten and a three-dimensional digital model used in VR and AR
technologies.
Both three-dimensional digital models and
watermarked signals are purely electronic, exist temporarily, and
depend on some other device to exist.250 Thus, assuming the court
would not distinguish an electronic signal and a three-dimensional
digital model, a three-dimensional model would fail to be patentable
if the court imported the interpretation of a manufacture from
Nuijten into the meaning of design patent’s § 171.
2. The Federal Circuit’s adherence to the limited definition of “manufacture”
in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission
In ClearCorrect, its most recent opinion interpreting the phrase
“article of manufacture,” the Federal Circuit maintained its narrow
view from Nuijten.251 The dental models in ClearCorrect are the closest
analogous subject matter to the types of digital models that are found
in the VR and AR worlds.252 Through its analysis, the court
undertook a lengthy, four-part statutory interpretation, ultimately
resulting in a narrow definition of the word “articles” that excluded

248. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (importing legal holdings from utility patent law).
249. See infra Section II.C.1 (describing how the decision in Hruby would permit a
three-dimensional digital model to be considered an article of manufacture).
250. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (outlining the
characteristics of a watermarked signal); supra text accompanying notes 242–47
(emphasizing that the reasons the Federal Circuit found the watermarked electronic
signal to not be patentable were almost identical to the reasons that the CCPA, the
Federal Circuit’s predecessor, rejected as dispositive for design patentability).
251. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
252. The three-dimensional models at issue in ClearCorrect were actual scans of a
patient’s teeth. See id. at 1286–87; supra text accompanying notes 201–03. These
scans were accurate enough to be 3D printed into physical models, underscoring the
detail of the model. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1287. Because of the quality, these
models are very similar to VR and AR three-dimensional digital models.
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three-dimensional digital models.253 However, the court was not
unanimous: Judge Newman wrote a vigorous dissent in that case and
also dissented to the denial of a rehearing en banc.254 Still, the
majority’s limited definition of an article of manufacture was
consistent with the narrow view outlined in Nuijten, ultimately
showing that the court would continue to adhere to the
interpretation excluding digital media.255
The court in ClearCorrect interpreted the Section 337 use of
“articles” as limited to tangible, material things; however, the analysis
strictly adhered to the understanding of technology and products of
the early twentieth century. The court unnecessarily restricted itself
to a century-old understanding of the meaning of “articles” as
outlined in dictionaries and tariff schedules.256 As a result, the court
ignored Congress’s intent in passing the statute, which was to provide
an additional safeguard against unfair competition by imports;
instead, the court focused on the practicability of enforcing a ban on
importation of intangible, digital media.257 With the emphasis on
tangibility, it is unsurprising that dictionaries from the early twentieth
century supported the court’s narrow view; the advancement of
electronic and digital technologies, which expanded society’s
awareness of intangible commerce, was obviously unforeseen at that
time.258 Underscoring this point, as Judge Newman emphasized in
her dissent, the Supreme Court has held that when interpreting
statutes that were passed before the Information Age, the courts
“must read the statutory language . . . in the light of drastic
technological change.”259 When read in this light, courts should
apply a broader view of the term “articles,” which would include
three-dimensional digital models.

253. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1299.
254. Id. at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting); ClearCorrect, 819 F.3d at 1337; see also text
accompanying notes 221–25 (reviewing Judge Newman’s dissent including her belief
that the court was departing from prior rulings of numerous judicial and
administrative bodies).
255. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1302; Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357.
256. See supra note 210 (noting that the court consulted dictionaries
contemporaneous with the Tariff Act).
257. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1295 (stating that “digital transmissions from
satellites do not move through border crossings, nor can they be stopped at our
borders via any enforcement mechanism contemplated in the statutory scheme”).
258. See id. at 1308 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“It cannot have been the legislative
intent to stop the statute with the forms of ‘article’ then known.”).
259. Id. at 1306 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392
U.S. 390, 396 (1968)).
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Further, as Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent to the
decision denying the rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit’s stance
on an article of manufacture counters the reading of the term in
patent law.260 In passing Section 337, Congress aimed to protect
domestic industry by safeguarding against unfair competition from
imports that infringe upon U.S. intellectual property rights, including
patents.261 Thus, when interpreting the term “article” in Section 337,
the Federal Circuit should have maintained a reading consistent with
the interpretation of the term in the utility patent statute. Based on
the limited definition of manufacture that the Federal Circuit adopted
in Nuijten, which rejected a watermarked electronic signal as
patentable subject matter, the court did just that: it continued to read
the term in a more limited light.262 However, as discussed earlier, in
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court established its broad, inclusive view of
The Court explained that
utility patentable subject matter.263
“Congress is free to amend” the patent statute, insofar as to limit any
subsequent interpretation by the courts.264 Contrary to the Supreme
Court’s reading, the Federal Circuit in ClearCorrect, acknowledging that
the last revision of Section 337 occurred prior to the creation of the
Internet, stated the opposite of the Supreme Court: “Congress is in a
far better position to draw the lines” of what should be included in the
meaning of articles within Section 337.265 Therefore, even though it
did not interpret the patent statute directly, the Federal Circuit still
severely limited a remedial option available to patentees.
ClearCorrect, which involved a three-dimensional digital model, is
the case most analogous to a design patent dispute involving a model
found in VR or AR. While it is possible to argue that the ClearCorrect
court’s decision is only applicable to the meaning of an article within
260. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334,
1338–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“It is established
that digital products are ‘goods’ and ‘merchandise’ and that their transmission via
the Internet is an importation into the United States. It is established that digital
goods are subject to the patent law. No authority has held that infringing digital
goods that are imported electronically are not subject to the laws of infringement or
of importation.”).
261. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (finding that Congress intended the scope of Section 337 to be broad).
262. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1286 (rejecting the broad interpretation of the
term “articles”).
263. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (discussing an inclusive
subject matter interpretation of § 101).
264. Id.
265. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1302 (quoting Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340
F.3d 1367, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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the ITC’s jurisdictional statute, this seems increasingly doubtful
because of the court’s view of an electronic signal in Nuijten.266 Thus,
based on ClearCorrect and Nuijten, it is unlikely that upon hearing a
case directly interpreting the term “article of manufacture” within
§ 171, the Federal Circuit would expand this position. In fact, it is
more likely that the court imports Nuijten’s interpretation of § 101
into § 171, overruling CCPA’s Hruby decision and ending the
USPTO’s practice of granting design patents for software icons.
B. The Changes in the Design Patent Statute Allude to a Broad
Interpretation
Based on the text of § 171, its legislative history, as well as how the
courts have incorporated the interpretations of the utility patent
statute into design patent law, the Federal Circuit should adopt a
broad view of the article of manufacture requirement. A textual
analysis of § 171 supports a broad interpretation of the article of
manufacture requirement. The statute currently requires that a
design merely be “for an article of manufacture.”267 This broad
language demonstrates the statute’s comprehensive scope.268
Further, the consistent simplification of the statutory language
reflects Congress’s preference for an inclusive patent subject matter
policy.269 Over a period of sixty years, Congress repeatedly simplified
the language of § 171 from narrow, enumerated categories to broad,
general language including “any” and “manufacture.”270
This
legislative history further indicates that Congress rejected a narrow
interpretation of the article of manufacture requirement.
Finally, the broad interpretation of the analogous utility patent
provision § 101 also supports a broad interpretation of the design
patent provision § 171. In Chakrabarty, for instance, the Supreme
Court construed § 101 and emphasized that, by choosing words like
“any” and “manufacture,” Congress intended for courts to read § 101

266. See supra Section II.A.1 (analyzing the implications of the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of a watermarked electronic signal).
267. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
268. In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 206 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“The proposed statute
removes all this specific statement, for the reason that as the statute stands it does not
include all the subjects which ought to be included, and from the inclusion of a
portion it suggests the non-inclusion of those not mentioned.” (quoting USPTO
Comm’r Allen in a letter to Congress supporting the 1902 amendments)).
269. See id. at 205–06.
270. See supra Section I.C.1 (providing an overview of the history of § 171’s
changing language).
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broadly.271 It also found ample support in § 101’s legislative history
supporting this view.272 The incorporation of these utility patent
provisions into § 171 therefore stems from § 171’s wording and
legislative history because § 171 is “subject to the conditions and
requirements of [Title 35].”273 Moreover, Congress’s preference for an
inclusive subject matter policy in § 171 is in accord with the Court’s
interpretation of § 101.274 The language of § 171 and § 101 uses
similarly expansive terms such as “any” and “manufacture.”275 Thus, like
the language and legislative history of § 101, the language and legislative
history of § 171 allude to an inclusive, broad reading.276 Further, the
courts have previously looked to the utility patent statute to justify
broadly construing other terms in § 171. This practice of incorporating
§ 101 to set the boundaries of § 171 should therefore make the Federal
Circuit feel comfortable continuing that trend and establishing a broad
interpretation of § 171’s article of manufacture requirement.
Thus, because of the choice of language in the statute, the
legislative history of § 171, and the tradition of incorporating
analogous provisions of the utility patent statute, the Federal Circuit
should read the statutory language “article of manufacture” broadly.
C. Applying the Broad Interpretation of § 171
1. The Hruby view of an article of manufacture includes three-dimensional
digital models
When the CCPA adopted a broad interpretation of § 171 in Hruby,
it provided a helpful framework to analyze three-dimensional digital

271. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be
given wide scope.”).
272. Id. at 308–09 (citing the early history of the first Patent Act of 1793, including
thoughts of the author, Thomas Jefferson, that defined statutory subject matter as
“any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new or useful improvement” (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318,
319)); supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
view in Chakrabarty).
273. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012); see supra Section I.B.2(a) (recognizing the courts’
importation of utility patent statutory provisions into design patent law).
274. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–10 (discussing an inclusive view of patentable
subject matter based on its interpretation of § 101).
275. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
276. See In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205–06 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
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models. Specifically, the Hruby court considered the design’s
permanence, tangibility, and dependence.277
Patentability hinges on the ordinary observer’s perception of the
three-dimensional model, not whether the virtual design itself is
tangible.278 Just as the fountain in Hruby ends when the water flow
stops, a three-dimensional model in the virtual world ceases to
exist when the computer acting as the engine of the virtual world
is shut down. However, the ephemerality of the design should not
limit its ability to be protected.279 “Presence” within the VR and
AR worlds allows for the creation of an environment that an
observer’s mind considers reality.280 Accordingly, while the VR or
AR technology is in use, an observer views a three-dimensional
model as if it constantly appeared, much like the fountain in Hruby
had a “constant” appearance.281 Hence, a three-dimensional
model should not be precluded from design patent protection just
because it only exists while in use. Further, a three-dimensional
model’s dependence on a computer engine should not exclude
the model from being considered an article of manufacture. Just
like the fountain in Hruby depended on water flow to operate, a
three-dimensional model depends on the computer that generates
it. Moreover, the CCPA in Hruby explicitly held that dependency
does not preclude a design from being considered an article of
manufacture under § 171.282 Accordingly, the fact that a threedimensional digital model is dependent on the computer should
not preclude it from being considered an article of manufacture
and receiving design patent protection.

277. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 999–1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see supra text
accompanying notes 124–36.
278. Cf. Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 197 (discussing the holding of
Hruby and emphasizing that the CCPA focused on “the perception of a design . . . not
whether the design is comprised of tangible, solid matter”).
279. See Hruby, 373 F.2d at 999 (rejecting the proposition that the temporary
nature of the droplets in a fountain should be a bar to design patentability, agreeing
that “[i]t is true that a particular droplet or droplets may be ‘a fleeting product[,]’
but the fountain . . . in its entirety under proper conditions presents a product of
constant appearance rather than a fleeting product” (citation omitted)).
280. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (emphasizing that VR devices
now create “presence,” which deceives the user’s mind into believing the
environment is real and not controlled by outside computer technology).
281. See Hruby, 373 F.2d at 999.
282. See id. at 1001; see also supra note 135 (providing examples of other designs
that had been granted design patent protection despite being dependent on other
materials).
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Including three-dimensional models in the scope of § 171 does not
alter the test for design patent infringement. Design patent
infringement is judged from the perspective of an “ordinary
observer.”283 The test evaluates whether a purchaser would find
substantial similarities between a protected design and the alleged
infringing design.284 Therefore, if an ordinary observer would view
the three-dimensional digital model and confuse it with a protected
design, then it is possible to find infringement even though the
infringing object is a digital model rather than a physical object.285
Furthermore, the size and mobility of a design do not affect
whether the design constitutes an article of manufacture within the
meaning of § 171.286 The Hruby court and, prior, the Hadden court,
underscored what constitutes an article of manufacture and clarified
that size and mobility should not restrict this definition.287 Thus, a
three-dimensional digital model should not be blocked from design
patent protection simply because it does not have a physical size and
is not physically mobile.
2. The USPTO has adopted the Hruby court’s view and should issue
patents for three-dimensional digital models that are present in VR and AR
The USPTO expanded the meaning of an article of manufacture to
include software icons, adopting the Hruby court’s broad view of
patentability.288 As technology has progressed, the software industry
has shifted away from programming three-dimensional models for
display on the computer screen towards creating environments in the
VR and AR worlds.289 Thus, because the USPTO has already shown
that it wants to protect new technologies by adopting the Hruby court’s

283. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) (establishing the test for
design patent infringement); see also 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012) (enumerating the
statutory requirement to bring a design patent infringement suit).
284. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
285. The success of the Oculus Rift and its ability to create “presence” further
bolsters this point. See Lang, supra note 43 (discussing achieving “presence” in virtual
reality); supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (underscoring the effect that
achieving “presence” has had on the commercial success of the Oculus).
286. See In re Hadden, 20 F.2d 275, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1927); see also Hruby, 373 F.2d at
1000 (reaffirming the Hadden court’s statement on size and mobility requirements).
287. See Hruby, 373 F.2d at 1000; Hadden, 20 F.2d at 276.
288. See MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I)(A) (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (citing Hruby, 373
F.2d at 1001); supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text (chronicling the USPTO’s
recognition of software icons as patentable designs under § 171).
289. See supra Section I.A (providing an overview of the history and development
of VR and AR technologies).
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view, it should follow this next progression of technology and explicitly
permit design patents to issue for three-dimensional digital models.
It is irrelevant that the three-dimensional model does not appear
directly on the computer screen like the permitted software icon. As
the Board at the USPTO decided in Strijland, Tayama, and Donoghue,
a software icon would be supported only if it was an ornamentality
“for an article of manufacture.”290 Thus, the USPTO eventually
granted design patent protection for software icons if the claim
included an outline around the icon representative of the computer
screen.291 The USPTO’s view of the computer icon as being an
ornamentality “for an article of manufacture” should not apply to
three-dimensional models. Because the VR and AR technologies’
achievement of “presence” has blurred the lines between the digital
and the physical worlds, it is no longer necessary to distinguish when
an object appears on a computer screen by using solid or dashed
lines around the claimed digital design.292
The USPTO should grant design patent protection without
requiring use of a solid or dashed line around the claim because, while
a three-dimensional model is a digital design, it is different from a
software icon. The key difference between the two is that a software
icon itself exists on a computer screen or as part of a software program,
making it unclear how the icon is displayed without providing the
context of the computer screen.293 Unlike a software icon, a threedimensional model does not need context for the user to understand
how the model is displayed because the model is presented as part of
physical reality, not a computer screen. Therefore, the USPTO should
continue to use the broad view of the Hruby court and grant protection
to three-dimensional digital models.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit should abandon the recently adopted line of
reasoning interpreting an article of manufacture as a physical,

290. See Ex parte Donoghue, No. 92-0539, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266, 1268 (B.P.A.I.
Apr. 2, 1992); Ex parte Strijland No. 92-0623, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1259, 1261 (B.P.A.I.
Apr. 2, 1992); Ex parte Tayama, No. 92-0624, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1615 (B.P.A.I.
Apr. 2, 1992); supra Section I.C.3 (documenting the history of appeals leading to
software icons being recognized as design patentable subject matter).
291. See MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I)(A).
292. See supra Section I.A.2 (illustrating the maturity of the VR and AR
technologies through the achievement of “presence” and, as a result, the blurring of
the physical and digital worlds).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 148–52.
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tangible object in the utility patent and ITC jurisdictional statutes. In
its most recent interpretation of § 171, the Federal Circuit’s
predecessor court, the CCPA, broadened the definition of an article
of manufacture to include a fountain, an object that is dependent on
a machine to run, ephemeral, and transient.294 This expansion is in
accord with the simplification of § 171, which moved from
enumerated categories of subject matter to a much broader
wording.295 Just as the USPTO expanded design patent subject
matter to include software icons, the court should interpret articles of
manufacture to include three-dimensional digital models. The
inclusion of digital models will allow designers who are developing
items for use in VR and AR worlds, as well as those designers whose
items already exist in the physical world, to fully protect their
intellectual property rights thus ensuring that statutory structure
keeps pace with the boom in VR and AR technologies. Without
abandoning its current course, the Federal Circuit’s narrow
interpretation puts design patent protection of these new
technologies at risk.

294. See In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
295. See Seymour & Torrence, supra note 88, at 192.

